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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Willie Stokes appeals from an or der of the District Court 
dismissing his petition for habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. 2254, as time-barred. We addr ess an issue of 
first impression for our court: Whether Stokes' time to file 
a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2244(d)(1) was tolled under 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(2) for the 
ninety day period during which Stokes could havefiled a 
petition for certiorari in the United States Supr eme Court. 
We join all of the other Courts of Appeals to have decided 
this issue, holding that the ninety day period during which 
a certiorari petition may be filed does not toll the applicable 
statute of limitations. Accordingly, we will affirm the order 
of the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
On August 21, 1984 Stokes was convicted, following a 
jury trial in a Pennsylvania state court, of first degree 
murder and possession of an instrument of crime. He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and to a 
concurrent term of years on the weapons count. 
 
Stokes' conviction was affirmed on dir ect appeal in 1986 
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for 
allocatur in 1987. Shortly thereafter, Stokes filed a petition 
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for relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Hearing Act, 
42 Pa. Const. Stat. S 9541 et seq. (r epealed). Relief was 
denied in February 1991, and that decision was affirmed by 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Stokes did notfile a 
petition for allocatur in the Pennsylvania Supr eme Court. 
 
On October 30, 1995, Stokes filed a second post- 
conviction request for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction 
Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat S 9541 et seq. (1988). Relief 
was denied on January 3, 1996 and the denial was affirmed 
on December 26, 1996 by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 
Allocator was sought and was denied by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court on July 2, 1997. 
 
Stokes filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus 
underlying this appeal on September 30, 1998. The United 
States Magistrate Judge concluded that Stokes' petition 
was time-barred under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 
S 2244(d)(1) and that Stokes had failed to establish any 
circumstance warranting application of equitable tolling. 
The District Court adopted the report and r ecommendation 
of the Magistrate Judge, dismissed the petition as time- 
barred, and denied a certificate of appealability. 
 
Stokes filed a timely appeal. On September 14, 2000 we 
granted a certificate of appealability as to the limitations 
issue posed by Stokes' petition. This issue is one of 
statutory construction subject to plenary review. 
 
II. 
 
In the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress amended the federal habeas 
statute by adding a one year statute of limitations for the 
filing of habeas corpus petitions. Section 2244(d)(1) 
provides in relevant part: 
 
       A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
       application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 
       custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 
       limitation period shall run from the latest of-- (A) the 
       date on which the judgment became final by the 
       conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time 
       for seeking such review. 
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       * * * * 
 
       (2) The time during which a properly filed application 
       for state post-conviction or other collateral r eview with 
       respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 
       shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 
       under this section. 
 
Although the statute itself did not provide for one, most 
courts of appeals, including ours, implied a one year grace 
period for petitioners whose convictions becamefinal before 
the effective date of the AEDPA. See Burns v. Morton, 134 
F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998). Because Stokes' conviction 
became final in 1987, he was entitled to the grace period 
and, on the basis of that grace period alone, would have 
been required to file his section 2254 petition on or before 
April 23, 1997. 
 
This April 23, 1997 date is not controlling her e, however, 
because when the AEDPA amendments became ef fective, 
Stokes was actively pursuing a state collateral action. As a 
result, his time for filing the federal habeas petition at issue 
here was tolled under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), so long as the 
state petition was pending. As the defendants note,"[T]he 
question here is when the [state collateral proceeding] 
ceased to be `pending.' " 
 
According to the defendants, that state pr oceeding ceased 
to be pending on July 2, 1997, the date on which the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Stokes' petition for 
allocator. Under this view, Stokes then had one year -- 
until July 1, 1998 -- to file the federal habeas petition. 
Stokes' petition was not filed until September 30, 1998. 
 
Stokes takes a different view, contending that the state 
proceeding should be deemed to have been pending for an 
additional ninety days after the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania declined to grant discretionary r eview -- these 
ninety days being the period during which he could have 
sought further review by the United States Supr eme Court. 
 
III. 
 
Although we have yet to address the precise question 
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posed here,1 we do not find ourselves in uncharted legal 
territory. Arguments similar to the one raised here by 
Stokes have been considered by a number of our sister 
courts of appeals. These courts have concluded, without 
exception, that the time during which a state prisoner may 
file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States 
Supreme Court from the denial of his state post-conviction 
petition does not toll the one year statute of limitations 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(2). See Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 
1033 (8th Cir. 2001); Gutierrez v. Schomig, 233 F.3d 490 
(7th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 19, 2001) 
(No. 00-1384); Isham v. Randle, 226 F .3d 691, 695 (6th Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2001 WL 76698 (U.S. 
Feb. 26, 2001) (No. 00-8222); Coates v. Byr d, 211 F.3d 
1225, 1227 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , ___ S. Ct. ___, 
2001 WL 138154 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2001) (No. 99-12642); Ott 
v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir . 1999), cert. denied, 
529 U.S. 1099 (2000); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F .3d 1153, 1155 
(10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1084 (2000). We 
now join these courts of appeals and conclude that Stokes' 
petition was properly dismissed as time-barr ed. 
 
We reach this conclusion for several r easons. First, we 
note that the language used in section 2244(d)(1)(A) differs 
from that found in section 2244(d)(2). "[U]nlike 
S 2244(d)(1)(A), which uses the phrase `became final by . . . 
expiration of the time for seeking [direct] . . . review,' a 
phrase that . . . takes into account certiorari pr oceedings, 
S 2244(d)(2) contains no such language." Snow v. Ault, 238 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In our decision in Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2000), we 
concluded that "pending" as that word is used in section 2244(d)(2) 
includes the time during which a petitioner seeks discretionary state 
court review, whether or not review is sought. Our holding in that case 
was tied to finality for purposes of habeas r eview: "If [the petitioner] 
had 
attempted to seek federal habeas relief while there was still time to seek 
allowance of appeal, the petition would be dismissed for failure to 
exhaust state remedies." Id. at 422. In Schwartz, we specifically reserved 
for another day the issue which we confront in this appeal: "We need not 
delve into the issue whether `pending' includes the time to file a 
petition 
for writ of certiorari in the United States Supr eme Court because that 
question is not presented by this appeal. Other courts have addressed 
this issue and find that the time does not toll." Id. at n.5. 
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F.3d at ___ (citation omitted). W e agree with the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: 
 
       [I]t seems clear that Congress intended to exclude 
       potential Supreme Court review as a basis for tolling 
       the one year limitations period. See Hohn v. United 
       States, 524 U.S. 236, 249-50 (1998) (observing that by 
       including particular language in one section of an act 
       but omitting it in another section of the same act, it is 
       presumed that Congress intended to exclude the 
       language). 
 
Isham v. Randle, 226 F.3d at 695. This reading of section 
2244(d)(2) is consistent with the requir ement that a 
petitioner exhaust state remedies prior to instituting a 
federal habeas petition. "Such exhaustion does not include 
seeking certiorari from the state court's denial of post- 
conviction relief." Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d at ___. 
 
The result is also consistent with our pr ecedent 
construing section 2244(d)(2). In Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 
153 (3d Cir. 1999), we considered whether a pending 
properly filed habeas petition tolls the statute of limitations 
under section 2244(d)(2) for purposes of filing a subsequent 
federal habeas petition.2 W e concluded that it does not: 
 
       Congress clearly intended that the word"State" would 
       be read to modify both "post conviction" and "other 
       collateral review" so that tolling would be afforded 
       under S 2244(d)(2) for various forms of state review 
       only. We find nothing in S 2244(d)(2)'s language or 
       legislative history, and nothing in the policy concerns 
       behind AEDPA's enactment to suggest a contrary 
       result. 
 
Id. at 159. Our conclusion in Jones supports the 
conclusion here that the statute of limitations was not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. There is a split in the circuits with regard to the issue decided in 
Jones. This split is highlighted in Walker v. Artuz, 208 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 
2000), cert. granted in part by Duncan v. W alker, 121 S. Ct. 480 (2000). 
The Supreme Court has agreed to deter mine whether a prior federal 
habeas corpus petition is an "application for State-post-conviction or 
other collateral review" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(2). 
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tolled during the period when Stokes could have sought 
review in the Supreme Court. 
 
Finally, we note the reasoning undertaken by the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Gutierrez v. Schomig, 
233 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2000). Ther e, the Court of Appeals 
held, as we do here, that the ninety days during which a 
petitioner could have filed a petition for certiorari in the 
United States Supreme Court did not toll the limitations 
period set forth in section 2244(d)(2). The Seventh Circuit's 
holding was narrower than the holdings of other courts to 
have considered this issue. The court in Gutierrez wrote: 
 
       Section 2244(d)(2) . . . provides that the limitations 
       period is tolled during the time that "a pr operly filed 
       application for State post-conviction or other collateral 
       review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 
       is pending." 
 
       * * * * 
 
       Because Gutierrez never filed a petition for certiorari 
       review in the Supreme Court, his potential certiorari 
       petition was never "properly filed." . . . [I]nstead of 
       excluding time a pleading could have been filed, 
       Congress explicitly required a "pr operly filed" pleading 
       to toll the statute of limitations. Gutierrez did not 
       properly file a petition for certiorari and, thus, the one- 
       year limitations period was not tolled during the time 
       [in] which he could have filed such a petition. Likewise, 
       a petition for certiorari that is not actually filed cannot 
       reasonably be considered "pending." 
 
233 F.3d at 491-92. 
 
Stokes, like Gutierrez, never filed a petition for certiorari. 
Consequently, the reasoning underlying the decision in 
Gutierrez applies here as well, pr oviding an alternate 
ground for our conclusion that Stokes' petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus was properly dismissed as untimely. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the ninety day 
period during which a state prisoner may file a petition for 
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a writ of certiorari in the United States Supr eme Court from 
the denial of his state post-conviction petition does not toll 
the one year limitations period set forth at 28 U.S.C. 
S 2244(d)(2). Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                8 
 
